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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff- Respondent, 
-vs-
MAX D. GILES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. ]7335 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the affirrnance of an appeal 
to the Third District Court from a criminal conviction of 
the Defendant-Appellant in the circuit court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant-appellant was found guilty in the 
Fifth Circuit Court, Coalville, Department, by Judge Larry 
R. Keller, of wreckless operation of a motor boat in violation 
of § 73-18-12 (1); . the conviction was appealed to the District 
Court, and was affirmed by Judge David B. Dee. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the decisions of the district and 
circuit courts. 
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was issued a citation for exceeding a 
slow wakeless speed within 100 feet of another boat; appeL 
promised to appear thereon at the Summit County Courthouse 
by August 14, 1979 (R. at 1). By August 15, 1979, appellar 
failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued for his m 
with the bail set at $50. 00 (R. at 3). Later that day, 
apparently, $25. 00 was received in the mail by the clerk's 
office and the bench was not issued, but the bail was never 
forfeited on the case (R. at 3, Tr. at 9). 
On October 31, 1979, a criminal complaint was 
issued charging the defendant with violation of Reckless 
Operation of a Motor Boat in violation of § 78-18-12(1), 
Utah Code Annotated ( R. at 12) • The appellant was duly 
arraigned on November 21, 1979, and a trial set for Decernb<: 
12, 1979 (R. at 5, 7). On December 11, 1979, an attorney 
enters an appearance and the trial is continued to another 
da/ ,.On the day of the trial, appellant for the first tirnr 
orally moved to have the matter dismissed on the basis that 
he had already been prosecuted on the original citation 
-2-. 
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which was a part of the same criminal episode as the present 
complaint (Tr. at 4-6). The trial court held that bail had 
never been forfeited on the original citation, thus there had 
been no adjudication, therefore the current prosecution was 
not barred by the single criminal episode statute (Tr. at 
1 7-9). The trial went forward and the defendant was convicted 
as charged (Tr. at 21, 50). Appellant appealed the conviction 
ar to the District Court and Judge David B. Dee affirmed the 




THE MERE POSTING OF BAIL FOR APPEARANCE 
ON A CRIMINAL OFFENSE IS NOT AN ADJUDICATION 
OF GUILT BARRING PROSECUTION FOR OFFENSES 
ARISING OUT OF THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
The posting of bail for appearance on a criminal 
offense is merely a procedure to insure the appearance of the 
defendant at the time of trial. On very minor offenses, 
if a person fails to appear as promised, a court may merely 
forfeit the bail as a matter of judicial economy in lieu of 
issuing a warrant for the arrest of the person for his 
failure to appear. There is no constitutional or other 
requirement placed on courts to forfeit bail; and such 
forfeitures are discretionary with the court. Obviously, 
a forfeiture of bail cannot take place until after the time 
set for the appearance of the defendant has expired, because 
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a criminal defendant has a right to an appropriate 
arraignment on the charge ( s) and a trial. In the present 
case, at the time of the appearance of defendant before thE 
court, through his duly authorized attorney, the court h~ 
not forfeited the bail which was posted to assure the 
defendant's appearance. 
The court explicitly explained to appellant: 
On this case, bail was posted. As you 
know, the legal status of bail is to insure 
the defendant's appearance in court. And 
this court has adopted the procedure that 
when forfeited by the court, then it 
constitutes an adjudication of the offense. 
However, this court specifically did not 
order forfeiture of bail. No forfeiture of 
bail appears in the file. The record also 
shows that a citation was issued to the 
defendant appellant requiring him to appear 
by August 14, 1979. (R. at 1). 
(emphasis added.) On August 15, 1979, the matter was callc 
up by the court and a minute entry shows that defendant: 
"Failed to appear prior to August 14. Bench warrant to is! 
Bail set at $50.00." (R. at 3.) Apparently later that da" 
a check for $25. 00 did arrive, because there is a hand-
written note that the bench warrant did not issue (R. at;; 
The $25. 00 bail was never forfeited by the court as indica: 
by the record and the court above. 
Al though appellant's bail was never forfeited, 
appellant tries to !'lake some significance of the fact tha'. 
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a bail schedule had been established by the court. (App. 
Br. at 7.) The State submits that no significance can or 
should attach to the fact that a bail schedule is issued 
from any court to clerks of the court, to jail personnel 
in charge of custody, or to whomever. Many bail schedules 
include amounts of bail for extremely serious felonies 
and serious misdemeanors. However, the fact that a schedule 
is established and jail personnel are able to release 
individuals who post the appropriate scheduled amount does 
not deprive the court having jurisdiction over that serious 
misdemeanor or felony from the discretion to have the defendant 
personally appear at the time that he has promised to do 
so. Yet appellant's reasoning would cause such a result. 
Even if the defendant~appellant had failed to appear 
at court, and even though the local practice of the court may 
have been to forfeit bail on minor offenses instead of 
requiring the appearance of the defendant at court, the 
State submits that the court is and should be clothed with 
the discretion to require the appearance of a defendant 
instead of forfeiting bail. 
The appellant also tries to lend significance to 
the fact that the bail money may have been sent to the 
Division of Wildlife Resources. The court explained the 
Gatter as follows: 
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And if, in fact, the twenty five dollars 
was sent to the division of wildlife resources 
it was done so without my knowledge and would,' b . b . Vf 
ee:r: ii: e~ror ecause it was set as bail. And 
until it is formally forfeited, it ought not to 
be sent anywhere. 
But, nevertheless, those are ministerial 
problems I think can be solved here, in this 
circuit court, and this court formally rules 
that there has not been an adjudication of 
this offense. (Tr. at 9). 
The court then went on to state that since there 
had not been an adjudication, the State had the right to ar 
the complaint to charge the offense of reckless 
operation of a motor boat~ and therefore appellant's motion 
to dismiss as a result of the single criminal episode was 
denied (Tr. at 9). 
The mere fact that an appearance bond is posted c: 
held by some agency awaiting further order of the court, doe 
not constitute a forfeiture of the bail, which could be 
considered an adjudication, until the defendant has failed• 
appear and the judge specifically entered an order forfeit: 
the bail instead of requiring the appearance of the defend< 
§ 76-1-403, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, clear 
defines the only instances in which a former prosectuion 
bars a subsequent prosecution for a crime arising out oft 
same criminal episode: 
-6-
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76-1-403. Former prosecution barring 
subsequent prosecution for offense out of 
same episode.~(l) If a defendant has been 
prosecuted for one or more offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode, a subse-
quent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal 
episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for 
an offense that was or should have been tried 
under section 76-1-402(2) in the former prose-
cution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) Resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or 
(iii)Was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) Was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that neces-
sarily required a determination inconsistent 
with a fact that must be established to secure 
conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
The statute continues by defining the terms used in § 76-1-403 
(l)(b) {i) (ii) (iii) and (iv), above. In the present case, 
clearly, there had not been an acquittal, a conviction, an 
improper termination, or a termination by final order that 
required a determination inconsistent with that necessary for 
a conviction. Thus the single criminal episode statutes to 
which appellant refers, and upon which appellant relies 
defeat his own argument. {App. Br. at 7). 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE INTENT REQUIRED BY§ 73-18-12(1) 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS AMENDED 
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. , 
Section 73-18-12 (1) defines the crime undec 
which appellant was convicted, and states: 
No person shall operate any 
motor boat . . . in a reckless or 
negligent manner so as to endanger 
the life, limb, or property of any 
person. 
Appellant inappropriately avers that the Utati 
State Code does not give a definition for "reckless" or 
"negligent," therefore those terms must incorporate the 
definitions of civil law (App. Br. at 10). That is not: 
case. ,'The criminal code at Section 76-2-103, Utah Co~' 
Ann., 1953, as amended, specifically defines the terms 
"recklessly" and "with criminal negligence." Both of 
these definitions apply to § 73-18-12 (1), under which t:.' 
defendant was convicted, in spite of the fact that that 
offense is not defined in the general criminal code 
(76-1-101, et seq.). Section 76-1-103 specifically 
states that "the provisions of this code shall govern th' 
construction of, the punishment for . . any offense 
defined outside this code." Thus the definition of 
. " 1·n § 76-2-1! 
"recklessly" and "with criminal negligence 
would apply to the present case. 
-8-
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It should be noted that the court below 
specifically found "reckless" conduct on the part of 
the defendant and thus any discussion of negligence 
is moot as to this case: 
And the court sees that as reckless 
disregard, in addition to the fact that 
he was within thirty feet of that boat 
before he even realizes it's there. 
Therefore, I find the defendant guilty 
as charged, of the offense of reckless 
operation of a motor boat. (Tr. at 109.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Certainly there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that any civil definition of negligence was applied 
in this case by the court, especially in view of the fact 
that the court specifically found reckless conduct. 
Even if the record were silent as to whether or 
not reckless conduct were found, and even if some type of 
speculation were appropriate as to the standard used by 
the Court, a person such as Judge Keller who acted for many 
years as legal defender for Salt Lake County, and was in 
the full-time practice of criminal law before going on the 
bench, would be presumed to have known the appropriate 
definitions of recklessness and with criminal negligence. 
The definition of the crime under which appellant 
was charged, and the definition of "recklessly" in the code 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
put a person of average intelligence on notice of the 
conduct proscribed. 
"'4 
There is no indication that the question of the 
requisite intent was raised in the trial court level, 
Because of the lack of contemporaneous objection, the 
matter should not now be considered on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
PRESENT CASE IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT, 
AND EVEN IF IT WERE, THE RECORD IS 
SUFFICIENT FOR A CONVICTION. 
This Court has long established the rule that 
it will not review appeals taken from a circuit court to 
the district court unless there is some constitutional 
question involved. The State submits that the only two 
constitutional issues raised by appellant were dealt with 
in Points I and II and that sufficiency of the evidence 
is not a constitutional issue. Even if the Court were 
to look at the facts in this case, the State submits 
there is sufficient evidence upon which to convict the 
defendant. Quoting merely from the judge's findings 
briefly to indicate the type of evidence considered: 
He tells us, by his own statement, 
that he sees the boat in the water with 
the water-skier. The testimony from the 
witness on shore is he's proceeding 
either in a straight line or an arc in 
the direction of that boat and the further 
testimony is that, by his own testmony, he 
was 100 yards away when he first saw that, 
which is only 300 feet. 
-10-
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And then, for some inexplicable 
reason, the next time he sees that 
boat, he's 30 feet away, he has to 
turn to avoid the collision and rams 
a waterskier and probably is very 
fortunate that the skier was not 
killed in this case. (Tr. at 108.) 
The State submits that there is certainly sufficient 
evidence to uphold the conviction even if that were an 
appropriate consideration for this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The bail posted on the original citation was 
never forfeited; therefore, nothing barred prosecution 
of the defendant for any crimes arising out of the same 
criminal episode. The definition of "recklessly" which 
has been upheld by this Court on many occasions, is not 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and was used by 
the lower court in determining appellant's guilt. 
Sufficiency of the evidence is not before this Court, 
but even if it were, the evidence was patently sufficient 
for conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to Mr. Robert A. Echard, Attorney for 
Appellant, 427 - 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 
day of April, 1981. 
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